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Gambling on Genes: Ambiguity Aversion Explains Investment in Sisters’ Children 
Brishti Guha1 
 
Abstract 
Many men invest in their sisters’ children instead of their wives’. Existing theories addressing 
such behavior depend on the level of paternity probability in such men’s societies being 
implausibly low. I link this anthropologically observed investment behavior with the 
experimentally observed phenomenon that some individuals are ambiguity averse. Arguing that 
men’s decisions are made under ambiguity, I show that an increase in ambiguity aversion results 
in investment in sisters’, rather than wives’, children. I show that this can happen even under risk 
neutrality. I also consider the special cases of a SEU maximizer and of extreme ambiguity 
aversion in the Gilboa-Schmeidler sense. Extremely ambiguity averse individuals invest in 
sister’s children regardless of risk preference or actual paternity rates. An increase in ambiguity, 
rather than an increase in ambiguity aversion, in contrast, may affect the investment decision 
either way. When sufficiently many men are ambiguity averse, inheritance norms could become 
avuncular, affecting women’s incentives and generating a bias towards actual nonpaternity. This 
is consistent with, but represents an unusual explanation of, data which show correlations 
between inheritance norms and actual paternity rates. 
 
1. Introduction 
While women can be certain that the children they bear are their own, men throughout history 
have faced the risk that they may not be the true fathers of their wives’ biological children.  As 
evident from recent court cases2 on “paternity fraud” – men suing for damages when paternity 
testing revealed that they had been financially supporting children who were not in fact theirs – 
many men are extremely reluctant to invest resources in children whose genetic relatedness to 
themselves was in doubt. As biologists, anthropologists and psychologists have observed, there 
exist a number of societies where men direct resources towards their sisters’ children, instead of 
their wives’ [Alexander (1974), Kurland (1979), Gaulin and Schlegel (1980), Daly, Wilson and 
                                                 
1 Department of Economics, Singapore Management University, 90 Stamford Road, Singapore 178903. Email: 
bguha@smu.edu.sg. I would like to thank participants at the SAET 2011 conference in Portugal. 
2 The court cases were from several different countries – the US, UK, Australia and South Korea and spanned the 
period 2000-2008. A summary of some cases can be found at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paternity_fraud. 
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Weghorst (1982), Hartung (1985), Wilson (1987)]. This begs the question of why such an 
avuncular inheritance pattern, or more generally avuncular investment, should obtain. Of course, 
even in societies which traditionally do not have this pattern – for instance, in developed western 
countries like the US, the UK and Australia – individual men may remain reluctant to invest in 
their wives’ or partners’ children. A large number of the court cases mentioned above were in 
these countries and originated in the men’s urge to ensure that the children they were obliged to 
support were in fact theirs. Similarly, Anderson et al (2007), studying men in New Mexico, finds 
that men doubtful about the paternity of their children spend less time with the children, are less 
involved in their education and are more likely to divorce their wives. 
 The traditional explanation for why men in some societies invest in their sisters’ children 
is the expected relatedness theory developed by Alexander, Kurland and others. The theory can 
be summarized as follows. A man can be sure that he shares some degree of genetic relatedness 
with his sister’s children, provided he and his sister share the same mother. In this case, his 
genetic relatedness to her children is bounded between 1/8 (if he and his sister have different 
fathers) and ¼ (if the sister is a full sibling). In contrast, his genetic relatedness to his wife’s 
children is either ½ (if he really is their father) or 0 (if he is not). The level of paternity 
probability in his society enters a man’s calculations of whether his expected relatedness with his 
wife’s children is higher than that of his sister’s children. A high level of paternity probability, 
on the one hand, increases his expected relatedness to his wife’s children by raising the 
likelihood that he is the true father. On the other hand, it could also push up his expected 
relatedness to his sister’s children simply by raising the likelihood that his sister is a full sibling 
of his, rather than a half sibling. The theory predicts that men will invest in their sisters’ children 
if the level of paternity probability in their society is below a certain threshold: for these levels, 
sisters’ children turn out to have a higher degree of expected relatedness than wives’ children. 
 This theory however runs into a difficulty. As Diamond and Locay (1989) also point out, 
the threshold level of paternity probability implied by the Alexander-Kurland model is very low, 
ranging from .28 to .33. This would imply a much higher nonpaternity rate (.67 to .72) than is 
observed in any society. [Anderson (2006) surveys 67 studies reporting nonpaternity rates: the 
highest rate reported was .55. However this was based on samples from paternity testing labs and 
therefore involved men who were sufficiently doubtful of paternity to request paternity tests. 
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Median worldwide levels of nonpaternity are estimated to be around .09 (Baker and Bellis 1995), 
though this is controversial.]  
 Diamond and Locay show that if men are risk averse, they may direct their investments to 
their sisters’ children even for moderate to fairly high levels of paternity probability (.6-.85). In 
this paper, I argue that men’s decisions to invest in either wives’ or sisters’ children are made in 
an ambiguous, rather than a risky, environment. While a detailed discussion on ambiguity is 
deferred to the next section, in the present context it signifies that men do not know the exact 
probability that they fathered their wife’s child(ren) ; they also may not know the probability that 
they and their sisters were fathered by the same man. In an ambiguous environment, expected 
utility theory or the expected relatedness model of Alexander and Kurland do not work, as these 
theories assume that probabilities are known. I then prove that an increase in ambiguity aversion 
biases men towards investing in sisters’ children in preference to wives’ children, as long as men 
derive greater utility from giving their assets to an heir with whom they share a greater degree of 
genetic relatedness. In particular, this result is compatible with risk neutrality or even risk 
preference. In contrast, an increase in ambiguity, as opposed to an increase in ambiguity 
aversion, can affect the sister’s child/wife’s child investment decision either way. I contrast these 
results with alternative results obtained under the assumption that people are subjective expected 
utility maximizers; the comparison shows that ambiguity aversion can explain investment in 
sisters’ children over a wider parameter range. I then discuss factors that might influence the 
frequency of ambiguity averters in the male population, and argue that avuncular inheritance 
norms would obtain where this frequency is sufficiently high. Such inheritance norms, where 
they developed, could affect women’s incentives and behavior, generating a link between men’s 
ambiguity attitudes, inheritance patterns and actual nonpaternity, which as I will discuss is 
consistent with empirical evidence. In this case, however, the causal link would run from 
ambiguity attitudes, to inheritance norms to lower than average paternity probability. High 
nonpaternity might thus be a result of avuncular inheritance norms – while it is traditionally only 
regarded as a cause of such norms [as in Flinn 1981].  
 My analysis thus offers a solution to the difficulty with the expected relatedness theory 
mentioned above that differs from Diamond and Locay’s.  
 At this point I clarify why men who invest in an avuncular fashion direct their resources 
to their sisters’ children and not their brothers’ children. Even if a man and his brother share the 
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same mother and are hence genetically related, there is no guarantee that the brother is in fact the 
father of his putative children. Hence there is a risk that one may be genetically unrelated to 
one’s brother’s putative children. In fact, Daly, Wilson and Weghorst (1982) in their account of 
the tendency of Naskapi-Montagnais men to invest in their sisters’ children mention that these 
men avoided investing in their brothers’ children because – according to the men’s own accounts 
- they were unsure of the true paternity of their brothers’ putative children. All the studies 
mentioned earlier involving avuncular investment involve investment in sisters’ children. 
 This paper adds to a growing economics literature on the implications of uncertain 
paternity and more generally on themes like incentives motivating inheritance patterns. The 
notion of uncertain paternity is implicitly considered in Becker (1973) which emphasizes that 
one obtains utility from one’s own children. Bishai and Grossbard (2007) model bride price as 
payment for marital fidelity on the wife’s part, and use Ugandan data to demonstrate a robust 
negative relationship between the level of bride price and the incidence of extramarital sexual 
relations among women (and by implication potential higher nonpaternity). Saint-Paul (2008), 
Francesconi, Ghiglino and Perry (2010) and Bethmann and Kvasnicka (2010) all discuss 
uncertain paternity in the context of theories about the origin of marriage or of the family. 
Doepke and Tertilt (2009) discuss paternity uncertainty as a reason for why men may place 
lower weight on children’s welfare than women do. Korn (2000) discusses the disutility men in 
polyandrous arrangements face from uncertain paternity. Some other papers (Edlund 2005, 2006, 
Edlund and Korn 2002) emphasize “paternity presumption” – the legal presumption that a 
woman’s husband is the presumed father of her child. These papers usually model marriage as a 
transfer of custodial rights from a woman to her husband, and a man is assumed to care about 
presumed, rather than true, paternity – in contrast to my paper as well as the literature just cited 
which focuses on the importance that men place on true paternity. In addition, economists have 
studied inheritance norms. For instance, Botticini and Siow (2003) discuss the origin of 
patrilineal inheritance. None of these papers focus specifically on ambiguity, however, unlike 
mine. 
 This paper also adds to the literature on applications of ambiguity aversion (the 
theoretical and experimental literature on ambiguity aversion is partially discussed in sections 2 
and 4). Etner et al (2011) provides a recent survey of work on ambiguity and ambiguity aversion 
; Camerer and Weber (1992) provides an older one. The idea of ambiguity aversion has been 
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applied to fields like financial markets [Condie and Ganguli 2011, Ozsoylev and Werner 2011, 
Dow and Werlang 1993, Neilson 2007 are a few examples among many], game theory 
[Eichberger and Kelsey 2011, Jungbauer and Ritzberger 2011], auctions [eg Dickhaut et al 
2011], insurance [eg Hogarth and Kunreuther 1985,1989], and problems of trade in general 
equilibrium models with asymmetric information [eg De Castro and Yannelis 2010, De Castro 
and Chateauneuf 2011]. By linking investment in sisters’ children to ambiguity aversion I 
highlight an important application of ambiguity aversion for which anthropological evidence 
exists. I also show how attitudes to ambiguity could explain how individuals make these 
investment decisions and discuss how this relates to inheritance norms favoring sisters’ children. 
 The plan for the rest of the paper as follows. In Section 2 I provide more background and 
facts on (a) paternal behavior and men’s investment decisions, and (b) ambiguity and ambiguity 
aversion. During the discussion I highlight the continued relevance of these issues. In Section 3 I 
explain how my problem ties these two areas together, and derive my results. Section 4 contains 
a detailed discussion while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. More on paternal behavior and ambiguity 
2.1 More on paternal behavior 
Evolutionary biology provides the driving force for genetic descendants being prized over others: 
natural selection favors individuals who direct scarce resources to those who share their genes, 
and away from competing claimants (a pattern of behavior biologists term “nepotism”). 
Accordingly, men faced a dilemma when deciding how much to invest in their partners’ children. 
If they were the real fathers of these children, the children would represent a better genetic 
investment than other, more distantly related, children. The problem however was that paternity 
was never certain, and men had to be wary of investing in unrelated children. 
 Evidence that paternity confidence influences the extent of paternal care and investment 
in offspring for all species of males was provided by Alexander (1974). He showed that among 
animals, males of species who lived in large groups where multiple males had access to any one 
male’s partner showed the least paternal involvement. Among humans, he noted that in cultures 
where, for instance, women lived on in their parents’ or siblings’ homes after marriage (instead 
of in their husbands’ homes) and so had greater freedom – men directed investments towards 
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their sisters’ children, instead of in their wives’. He attributes this to lower or variable paternity 
confidence among these men. 
 As noted by Aberle (1961), 84 out of a total of 565 societies listed in Murdock’s World 
Ethnographic Sample (a representative sample of all world cultures) had a matrilineal inheritance 
norm whereby a man would leave his assets not to his partner’s children, but to his sister’s 
children. If he did not have a sister with children, he would instead leave his assets to a brother 
who shared the same mother (but not to this brother’s children, for reasons explained in the 
introduction). (Note that a brother who shared the same mother was also certain to share some of 
the man’s genes, because of maternity being certain). Diamond and Locay (1989) use Flinn’s 
dataset listing a total of 150 societies which had matrilineal inheritance. According to 
ethnographers, societies where maternal uncles routinely passed on assets to their sisters’ 
children were quite varied in their characteristics. For instance, in many of them, either the sister 
or her children also lived with the maternal uncle3 (Aberle 1961). However there were others 
where men lived with their wives and children but nevertheless passed on their land and their 
titles (for example, offices as chiefs/headmen) to their sisters’ children, with whom they 
maintained a close relationship. Societies with matrilineal inheritance were also quite varied with 
respect to geographical location (a few examples being the Navaho of Arizona, Utah and New 
Mexico, the Nairs of Kerala – in southwestern India, the Trobriand Islanders – near New Guinea, 
the Tuareg of Mediterranean Africa, the Garos of the hills bordering Burma, the Ashanti of 
Ghana, the Na of southwestern China, and the Minangkabau of western Indonesia.) They also 
varied with respect to the dominant mode of economic activity (for instance, some were pastoral, 
while others were agrarian with hoe cultivation, while yet others were agrarian with plough 
cultivation or terraced farming). 
 As evident from the account above, men in a significant minority of world cultures chose 
to invest not in their partners’ children but in their sisters’ children (or failing that, in other 
matrilineal relatives, such as brothers sharing the same mother). Daly, Wilson and Weghorst 
(1982) mention similar behavior among the Masai, who had low paternity confidence due to 
traditions of wife-sharing, and among Naskapi-Montagnais men. Moreover, many men in these 
cultures explicitly mention paternity uncertainty as the reason for their investment strategy. It is 
                                                 
3 To put it another way, men lived with their sisters and the sisters’ children, while paying periodic nightly visits to 
their own wives or lovers. 
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interesting to note that in those matrilineal cultures where women traditionally lived with their 
husbands, the husbands usually had several wives (each wife lived in a semi-independent “hut” 
with her children). Therefore, the husband was often unable to monitor the sexual activities of an 
individual wife (Hughes 1982). Hence, there was more room for doubts regarding paternity. 
Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) and Hartung (1985) both found that men’s investment in their wives’ 
children was significantly negatively correlated with women’s sexual freedom, as measured by 
either (a) the absence of a sexual double standard, (b) the incidence of extramarital and 
premarital sex or (c) traditions of wife-sharing. Similarly, Diamond and Locay (1989), using 
Flinn’s dataset, find that while father’s kin constituted the major source of inheritance in 96% of 
societies with “very high” paternity confidence (where the index of paternity confidence was 
constructed by Flinn based on the prevalence of extramarital sex), they did so only in 14% of 
societies with “very low” paternity confidence. 
 I now briefly turn to some other work on paternal behavior. Anderson et al (2007) – 
studying men in modern New Mexico - finds that men doubtful about the paternity of their 
children spend less time with the children, are less involved in their education and are more 
likely to divorce their wives. Daly and Wilson (1982) using data from videos of live births in the 
U.S, as well as data from surveys, find evidence of the overwhelming importance placed on 
paternal resemblance for newborn infants: almost all mothers in their data claimed that the infant 
resembled the (putative) father while hardly any emphasized the infant’s resemblance to herself 
(or to other maternal relatives). Moreover the mothers repeatedly emphasized to the putative 
fathers how much the infant resembled them (the fathers). The authors interpret this as a (mostly 
subconscious, and in some cases conscious) ploy on the mothers’ part to boost paternity 
confidence in their partners, thereby encouraging the putative father to invest in the child. Gaulin 
and Schlegel (1980) emphasize that even in cultures with a patrilineal inheritance norm, where 
fathers traditionally leave their property to their (putative) children, individual men who are 
doubtful about paternity remain reluctant to do so. 
Turning to the preference that men have for investing in their sisters’ children as opposed to 
their brothers’ children, Gaulin, McBurney and Brakeman-Wartell (1997) have also shown that a 
matrilineal bias exists for uncles, with a mother’s siblings perceived to be significantly more 
solicitous on average than a father’s siblings. Interestingly, Gaulin et al’s study is not based on 
anthropological data but on experimental data collected from contemporary western college 
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students. A tendency to invest in sisters’ children, if not to share one’s inheritance with them, 
therefore persists in some degree even in modern western societies lacking an avuncular 
inheritance norm. Daly, Wilson and Weghorst (1982) in their account of the tendency of 
Naskapi-Montagnais men to invest in their sisters’ children mention that these men avoided 
investing in their brothers’ children because – from their own accounts - they were unsure of the 
true paternity of their brothers’ putative children. 
It may sometimes be objected that individuals in modern society do not place any importance 
on genetic relatedness – citing the prominence of families with step children and adopted or 
foster children. However, the prominence of these family types does not prove that people no 
longer value genetic relatedness, or that men have stopped disliking the notion of ambiguous 
paternity. The issue of a step or adopted child differs from the problem under study. First of all, 
there is no ambiguity involved. Agreeing to raise a step or an adopted child involves an 
individual knowingly agreeing to raise another’s child, either (in the case of step parenting) 
driven by “mating effort” directed to the child’s biological parent, or (in the case of adopted 
children) due to lack of biological children, among other motives. Secondly, making a conscious 
decision to raise such children does not prove that biological children would not receive even 
more care. For instance, there is evidence that suggests that people on average favor biological 
over non-biological children in households where both are present (Case et al (1999), Wilson and 
Daly (1987), Daly and Wilson (1985)) : biological children receive more nourishment, and are 
less likely to be neglected or abused. Daly and Wilson (1985) found using Canadian data that 
children living with a mother and a stepfather were 40 times more likely to face child abuse than 
children living with both biological parents: in the vast majority of cases, abusive stepfathers 
never abused their own biological children. On a slightly different issue, there is also evidence of 
an investment bias towards sisters’ children (but not brothers’ children) in contemporary western 
societies (as in Gaulin et al 1997). Moreover, while paternity tests are available in modern times, 
their use has not become a norm, (instead of being used whenever a child is born, they are used 
on very rare occasions) and is in many countries and states subject to the consent of the child’s 
mother, and therefore cannot be used at will by the (putative) father. While avuncular inheritance 
norms were clearly developed by men in older societies before the advent of paternity testing 
technology, the advent of paternity testing by itself does not remove paternal ambiguity entirely. 
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2.2 More on Ambiguity 
Knight (1921) first raised the distinction between “measurable uncertainty” or risk and 
“unmeasurable uncertainty” or ambiguity. Risk refers to a situation where an action is associated 
with a range of possible outcomes but the probability of each outcome is precisely known. Thus, 
one could calculate the expected utility arising from an action as 
1
( )
N
s s
s
E U p u
=
=∑                                                              (1) 
where E(U) denotes expected utility, the action can yield a state-specific utility su  in state s, the 
total number of states is N (with states being numbered from 1 to N), and where the probability 
of state s occurring is sp , with
1
1
N
s
s
p
=
=∑  (ie, states 1 to N exhaust the set of possible outcomes). 
 In contrast, ambiguity refers to a situation where an action can lead to different possible 
outcomes, but the probability of each outcome is unknown. Therefore, it is not possible to 
compute expected utility as in (1). Accordingly, individuals making decisions under ambiguity 
must use some decision criterion other than maximization of expected utility. 
 Ambiguity was also mentioned by Keynes (1921) who believed that entrepreneurs’ 
profits represent a reward to their taking on ambiguity (as distinct from risk taking). Research on 
ambiguity gained prominence with the Ellsberg paradox (1961). The Ellsberg Paradox is best 
illustrated through the following example. 
Example : Consider an urn with 90 balls. 30 of these balls are red while the remaining 60 are 
some combination of black and yellow. However the number of black balls or of yellow balls is 
unknown. A ball can be drawn from the urn and a bet placed on its color. Now consider the 
following 4 bets (a) you win $50 if the ball drawn is red, (b) you win $50 if the ball drawn is 
black, (c) you win $50 if the ball drawn is either red or yellow, and (d) you win $50 if the ball 
drawn is either black or yellow. Ellsberg found that many people preferred (a) to (b) and (d) to 
(c), and argued that this was a violation of expected utility theory. To see this, note that for (a) to 
yield greater expected utility than (b), we must have 
R R B Bp u p u>                                                                (2) 
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where the subscripts R and B denote red and black balls respectively, p denotes probability and 
u  a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function defined over outcomes. Given the specific 
example, we note that (50), 1/ 3R B Ru u u p= = = . Now, note that the probability of a ball being 
either red or yellow is simply the sum of the probabilities of the ball being red and of the ball 
being yellow (and similarly for the probability of its being black or yellow). For (d) to yield 
greater expected utility than (c), we must therefore have 
B B Y Y R R Y Yp u p u p u p u+ > +                                                    (3) 
However, canceling the common term from both sides of (3), we get 
B B R Rp u p u>  
which contradicts (2). 
 The explanation of the Ellsberg Paradox lies in ambiguity aversion. Ambiguity averse 
individuals dislike situations where probabilities are unknown. Note that while Rp  is known (to 
be 1/3), Bp  is unknown. In an extreme case, the subject may be afraid that all 60 of the “black or 
yellow” balls may be yellow. Therefore, an ambiguity averse individual will prefer bet (a) to bet 
(b). At the same time, however, while the probability of being black or yellow is known 
( 2 / 3B Yp p+ = , since 60 of the balls are either black or yellow), the probability of being red or 
yellow is not (since while Rp  is known, Yp is not). Hence this same ambiguity averse individual 
will prefer bet (d) to bet (c). [See Machina (2009) for an analysis of how the Ellsberg urn 
experiment involves both subjective uncertainty (with regard to the color of the ball) and 
objective uncertainty (related to the draw itself) and associated theoretical implications]. 
 Subsequently, there has been a large experimental literature on attitudes to ambiguity 
[Hogarth and Kunreuther 1989, Heath and Tversky 1991, Fox and Tversky 1995, Chua and Sarin 
2002, Dominiak and Schnedler 2011, among others] which confirms that many individuals are, 
indeed, ambiguity averters. There has also been some work on the determinants of ambiguity 
aversion. For instance, Heath and Tversky (1991) and Fox and Tversky (1995) find that a feeling 
of incomplete information increases ambiguity aversion while individuals who are very 
confident of their knowledge are ambiguity-seeking. 
 What decision criteria do individuals use in the presence of ambiguity? The axiomatic 
foundation for the decision-making criterion I use in this paper was developed by Klibanoff, 
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Marinacci and Mukerji4 (2005) “the smooth ambiguity model”; somewhat similar models are 
also developed by Nau (2006), Chew and Sagi (2008) and Ergin and Gul (2009). [Other recent 
theoretical work on ambiguity includes Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2011), Klibanoff et al (2011), Nau 
(2011). Jewitt and Mukerji (2011) examines the comparative statics of an increase in ambiguity. 
More generally, theoretical work on violations of expected utility, or “subjective” expected 
utility – where the underlying idea is that although probabilities are unknown, individuals have 
prior beliefs about possible distributions of probabilities - includes Machina and Schmeidler 
(1992), Machina (2004) and Machina (2005), among others. Machina (2005) summarizes other 
theoretical approaches to violations of expected utility].  
In the KMM model, ambiguity aversion is modeled as a dislike of uncertainty over 
expected utility; an ambiguity-neutral individual would simply be a subjective expected utility 
(SEU) maximizer who maximizes the expected utility over a distribution of priors about 
probabilities. In mathematical terms, individuals maximize a function ( )E G E uofμ π , where E is 
the expectations operator, f is an act, u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function, G is an 
increasing transformation, and μ is the decision-maker’s subjective distribution over the set Π  
of probabilities π  that the decision-maker considers relevant based on his information. Klibanoff 
et al prove that ambiguity aversion is equivalent to concavity of the function G . In contrast (as 
also argued by KMM), if G  is linear, the decision criterion reduces to subjective expected utility 
maximization; the only difference from expected utility maximization being that expectations 
need to be taken over priors regarding probabilities. Convex G  represents ambiguity-seeking 
behavior. In addition, another well-known formulation of ambiguity aversion – the Gilboa-
Schmeidler or MEU (minimax expected utility) model, can be regarded as a special case of the 
KMM formulation. Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) model is built on Wald’s minimax criterion 
and argues that uncertainty averse people will take the minimal expected utility (over all possible 
priors) into account while evaluating bets. Hence they prefer the act which entails a better worst 
case scenario. Ambiguity aversion in the Gilboa-Schmeidler sense represents an “extreme” form 
of ambiguity aversion in the KMM sense. Since the formulation described above is fairly 
general, and accommodates SEU and MEU as special cases, I apply it to my analysis. 
 
                                                 
4 Henceforth KMM. 
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3. Ambiguity Aversion and Investment in Sisters’ Children 
In tune with theories of evolutionary biology, according to which men seek to maximize the 
survival of their genes and therefore invest in genetically related individuals, I start off by 
considering a simple utility function for men: 
( ), '( ) 0u u r u r= >                                                  (4) 
Here, ( )u r  is simply genetic, and denotes the satisfaction that a man gets from giving his 
inheritance to a child whose genetic relatedness to him is given by r . Utility is increasing in r , 
but we have imposed no restrictions as yet on second derivatives. Linear utility would imply that 
men are risk neutral. Thus, a fall in genetic relatedness will not cause a greater utility loss than 
the utility gain from an equivalent gain in genetic relatedness. A risk averse individual would 
have ''( ) 0u r < , while a risk lover would have "( ) 0u r > .  
Is ambiguity relevant to a man’s problem of investing in his wife’s or his sister’s 
children? I argue that it is. A man is unlikely to know the precise probability that his wife’s child 
is really his own. If she has a number of children, he is similarly unlikely to know for sure how 
many of these children are his. Most men will also not know the precise level of nonpaternity in 
their society, and even if they do, this may not tell them much about the paternity of their own 
wife’s children. Therefore, this is a situation more relevant to ambiguity than to risk. While a 
man might certainly have priors with regard to his probability of being the real father of a child, 
it was not possible for him to assign a known probability to the event of paternity. (While 
paternity tests provide men with a statistic known as “probability of paternity”, recall that we are 
discussing the origin of norms of investing in sisters’ children, at a time when such statistics 
would not have been available. Moreover even in modern times, not all men would request such 
a test, or would be in a position to do so – for example, if the wife’s consent is required – but 
may still face some uncertainty regarding paternity). 
 Turning to investment in sisters’ children, provided the man and his sister share the same 
mother, some degree of genetic relatedness with her children is unambiguous (as explained in the 
introduction, the lower bound of relatedness here is 1/8), however, there is some ambiguity about 
the exact extent of relatedness, because the man may be unsure if his sister is a full sibling. To be 
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consistent with the fact that a man does not know the probability that he has fathered his wife’s 
children, it seems reasonable to assume that he similarly does not know the probability that he 
and his sister were fathered by the same man. 
 I now state my main result. 
Proposition 1: Fixing information sets and beliefs (distributions over probabilities), an increase 
in ambiguity aversion increases the likelihood that men will invest in their sisters’ children, in 
preference to their wives’ children. Moreover, the result holds even for risk neutral preferences. 
Proof: For any hypothetical level of paternity probability p, denote a man’s expected utility from 
investing in a sister’s child and investing in a wife’s child by ( )pEU S  and 
( )pEU W respectively.
5 We have 
1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )
4 8p
EU S pu p u= + −                                                (5) 
And 
1( ) ( ) (1 ) (0)
2p
EU W pu p u= + −                                                  (6) 
(5) reflects the fact that if a man’s sister is a full sister, which is the case with probability p, he is 
related to her child by a coefficient of ¼, while if she is a half-sister, which is the case with 
probability 1-p, he is related to her child by a coefficient of 1/8. (6) reflects the fact that a man is 
related to his wife’s child by a coefficient of ½ if he is the real father, and 0 if not. Note that 
(5)=(6) at p=p*, such that 
1( ) (0)
8* 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) (0)
2 4 8
u u
p
u u u u
−
=
− + −
                                             (7) 
Also, observe that  
( ) 1 1 1 ( )( ) (0) ( ) ( )
2 4 8
EU W EU Su u u u
p p
∂ ∂
= − > − =
∂ ∂
 
                                                 
5 While I focus on the decision to invest in a wife’s child versus a sister’s child, the decision to make mixed 
investments (for example, whether to invest in 2 children of one’s wife, or in 1 child of one’s wife and 1 of one’s 
sister) can also be accommodated in this framework. Results are qualitatively similar, and available on request. 
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as 1 1 1( ) ( ), (0) ( )
2 4 8
u u u u> < . Therefore, it is clear that ( ) ( )EU W EU S≥  for p≥p*, while the 
inequality is reversed for p<p*. Now, using the formulation described in the previous section, a 
man invests in his sister’s child in preference to his wife’s if and only if 
[ ( ( )) ( ( ))] 0
p
p p
p
G EU S G EU W dμ− >∫                                           (8) 
where the man’s information set and beliefs tells him that p is in the range [ ,p p ] and distributed 
with cdf μ . Now note that for an ambiguity averse individual, G  is concave; an increase in 
ambiguity aversion is represented by an increase in concavity. That is, if B is more ambiguity 
averse than A, ( ), ' 0, '' 0B AG h G h h= > < ; the G  function for B is a concave transformation of 
the G  function for A. Now note that the property of a concave function is to give greater weight 
to lower values; more precisely, if G  is concave, 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )G x G y G x z G y z− > + − +                                             (9) 
Relative to a linear G , which reduces to SEU maximization, a concave G  gives greater weight 
to lower values of p in the information set, for which as we have shown, the difference 
( ) ( )p pEU S EU W−  is positive. It gives relatively low weight to higher values of p, for which this 
difference is negative. Therefore, the effect of this weighting is to bias men in favor of investing 
in their sisters’ children, relative to the case of ambiguity neutrality (linear G  or SEU 
maximization). Moreover, the more concave G  is, the more likely is it that the positive terms in 
(8) outweigh the negative ones, and hence an increase in ambiguity aversion makes men more 
likely to invest in sisters’ children. Moreover, note that we have never needed to use the second 
derivative of u  in this proof. Hence, the proof holds for risk neutral preferences as well, which 
as can be easily checked involves p*=1/3. QED 
Proposition 1 involves a contrast of the ambiguity aversion case with the case of ambiguity 
neutral preferences, which, as KMM have shown, essentially reduces to subjective expected 
utility maximization. The former is thus able to explain investment in maternal kin over a larger 
range of parameters than the latter. 
Corollary 1: Risk aversion and ambiguity aversion work in the same direction. 
Proof: As shown in Proposition 1, ambiguity aversion increases the likelihood of investing in 
sisters’ children. Now consider a framework where individuals are ambiguity neutral (to 
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eliminate the effects of ambiguity aversion) so that G  is linear. Next, first consider the case of 
risk neutrality. Setting u(r)=r in (7), we obtain p*=1/3. Meanwhile the expression in (8) reduces 
to [ ( ) ( )]
p
p p
p
EU S EU W dμ−∫ , which is positive only for p<1/3. However, now consider risk 
aversion, so that '' 0u < , and p* continues to be given by (7). Note that due to the concavity of 
u , we have 
1 1 1( ) ( ) 2[ ( ) (0)]
2 4 8
u u u u− < −                                               (10) 
implying p*>1/3. Now, with risk aversion, the increase in p* means that the range of p over 
which p<p* and therefore men invest in sisters’ children increases. In other words, the terms in 
(8) are positive over a greater range than before. Thus, risk aversion, like ambiguity aversion, 
increases the tendency to invest in sisters’ children, given information sets and beliefs. QED 
 
Example 1 
Consider μ  to be such that three probabilities – p=0, p=1/3 and p=1 – are all equally likely; 
(0) (1) (1/ 3) 1/ 3μ μ μ= = = , and risk neutral preferences. Individuals are ambiguity averse, with 
( )G x x= . Now the LHS of (8) reduces to 
1 1 1 1 2 1[ ] 0
3 4 2 8 3(2 2)
−
− + = >  
so that men prefer to invest in their sisters’ children. To illustrate the comparative static effect of 
a reduction in ambiguity aversion, consider a less concave G  function, with 
3/ 4 3/ 2( ) ( )G x x x= = . Now the LHS in (8) has the same sign as 
3/ 4 3/ 4 3/ 4 1/ 2 1/ 21 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ) [1 ( ) (2 2) ] 0
4 2 8 2 2 2 2
− + = + − <  
on calculation. This example illustrates a case where men invest in wives’ children under low 
levels of ambiguity aversion, but in sisters’ children when more ambiguity averse. 
Example 2: Ambiguity aversion in the Gilboa-Schmeidler sense (MEU) 
Investing in a wife’s child gives a risk-neutral man a payoff of ½ in state s, where s is defined as 
the state in which “the man is really the father of the child”, and a payoff of 0 in state sC which is 
the complement of state s. That is, the man gets a payoff of 0 from a genetically unrelated child. 
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Thus the minimal expected utility, over all possible priors, from investing in a wife’s child is 
u(0). Investing in a sister’s child gives this same man a utility of u(¼) in state q, where q is 
defined as the state in which “the man and his sister share the same father” (it is already assumed 
that they share the same mother), and a utility of u(1/8) in state qC, the complement of state q. 
Thus the minimal expected utility from investing in a sister’s child is u(1/8). As 1/8>0, men who 
are ambiguity averse in the Gilboa Schmeidler sense would invest in sisters’ children in 
preference to wives’ children. This is independent of risk attitudes, or actual paternity rates. 
In contrast to an increase in ambiguity aversion, an increase in ambiguity can affect the 
investment decision either way. Holding ambiguity attitude, or the function G , constant, and an 
increase or reduction in ambiguity can be represented in terms of the decision-maker’s 
information set about possible paternity probabilities. 
Definition: We say that there has been a reduction in ambiguity from state A to state B if 
( ) ( )B AΠ ⊂ Π ; the decision maker’s information set in state B is a strict subset of his information 
set in state A.6 
Proposition 2: Holding ambiguity attitude and risk preferences fixed, a reduction in ambiguity 
may either increase or decrease the likelihood of investing in a sister’s child versus a wife’s 
child. 
Proof: If the reduction in ambiguity is accomplished by eliminating low values of p from the 
information set, ie eliminating values in the range [0,p*], this reduces the mass of positive terms 
in the LHS of (8), making it more likely to be negative, so that it is better for men to invest in 
their wives’ children. However, if the reduction in ambiguity is accomplished by ruling out some 
high values of p (in the range [p*,1]), this has the opposite effect, reducing the mass of negative 
terms in the LHS of (8) and tending to make it positive. In this case, a reduction in ambiguity 
could increase the tendency to invest in a sister’s child. Thus the results depend on whether the 
information obtained indicates paternity to be relatively probable or not. QED 
Summarizing, in the standard expected relatedness model of Alexander and Kurland, 
there is no ambiguity, people are risk-neutral and ambiguity-neutral and each individual knows 
his own exact risk of nonpaternity. As mentioned in the introduction, in that framework, men 
invest in sisters’ children only if paternity probability is implausibly low.  I have considered an 
                                                 
6 Jewitt and Mukerji (2011) formulate two different notions of what is meant by “more ambiguous”. My definition is 
closer to their “more ambiguous II” concept than to their “more ambiguous I” . 
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ambiguous environment, and shown that an increase in ambiguity aversion makes it more likely 
that men will invest in sisters’ children. This happens even if men are risk neutral, and is 
reinforced if they are risk averters. Moreover men who are ambiguity averse in the Gilboa-
Schmeidler sense will always invest in sisters’ children regardless of the actual level of 
nonpaternity in their societies – even if they are risk neutral or risk loving. Unlike an increase in 
ambiguity aversion, an increase in ambiguity holding ambiguity attitudes constant can make 
investment in sister’s children either more or less likely. Results on decisions involving mixed 
investment (should one invest in two children of one’s wife’s, or in only one while investing in 
one child of a sister’s?) are qualitatively similar and are omitted here in the interests of brevity. I 
now turn to a discussion of what factors could influence ambiguity aversion in this genetic 
context and relate my finding to other results on ambiguity aversion. 
 
 
4. Discussion  
The preceding section shows that the decision of whether to invest in one’s wife’s or one’s 
sister’s children is made in an ambiguous environment, and an increase in ambiguity aversion 
biases men to investing in their sisters’ children, even for men who are neutral to known risks. 
Interestingly, experimental evidence suggests that attitudes to ambiguity and to risk are not 
highly correlated (Camerer and Weber 1992 survey such studies), therefore, it is plausible that 
ambiguity averters may display a wide variation in their risk preferences. 
 What affects the frequency of “genetic ambiguity averters” in any given population of 
males? Such factors may include a woman’s participation in activities outside the home – 
possibly in agriculture or other economic activities – which would increase her access to other 
men, patterns of residence that would have the same effect (for example, matrilocal or 
avunculocal residence patterns, where the husband or his kin’s ability to monitor her activities is 
reduced), and frequent warfare threats which necessitate prolonged absences from home on the 
husband’s part. While none of these factors necessarily lead to higher nonpaternity the crucial 
fact is that they provide women with the opportunity to cheat and reduce the husband’s 
information about paternity. Heath and Tversky (1991) and Fox and Tversky (1995) have shown 
that a feeling of incomplete information increases ambiguity aversion while individuals who are 
very confident of their knowledge are ambiguity-seeking. Hence, one could plausibly argue that 
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the presence of factors that reduce the husband’s information about paternity might increase the 
proportion of ambiguity averters. Conversely, genetic ambiguity aversion would only plague 
relatively suspicious or fearful individuals in cultures where even women’s opportunities to 
cheat were minimal. 
 Chua and Sarin (2002) have shown that people are more averse to “unknown” than to 
“unknowable” uncertainty. That is, they display more aversion to taking bets about which they 
realize that some one else may possess greater information than they do. These same individuals 
may not mind taking on an uncertain bet provided they know that no one else has more 
information than they do (an “unknowable” uncertainty). Note that paternity uncertainty falls in 
the “unknown” rather than the “unknowable” category as presumably a man’s wife would have 
more information about the paternity of her children than her husband would, and the husband 
would be aware of this. 
 When the proportion of ambiguity averse men is sufficiently high, men might decide to 
vote for an avuncular inheritance pattern. This critical proportion would be ½ for a democracy 
where decisions are taken by majority voting. However, it could be lower if, for instance, 
decisions were taken by a small minority (for example local chiefs) and more than ½ the 
members in this minority were averse to ambiguity. Interestingly, there is evidence that 
avuncular inheritance patterns develop in cultures with the characteristics mentioned above. For 
instance, the Nairs of Kerala had a matrilocal residence pattern (with women staying on in their 
dotal homes after marriage) and their men traditionally spent much of their time away from 
home fighting wars. The Nairs had an avuncular inheritance pattern. Similarly, cross tabulations 
based on Murdock and White’s Standard Cross-Cultural Sample (SCCS) (a controlled sample of 
world cultures from Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas corrected for regional diffusion effects and 
auto-correlations) demonstrate a strong correlation between matrilocal residence and inheritance 
patterns that involved men giving their property to their sisters’ children. For instance, in a 
sample of 30 cultures where maternal kin inherited, 24 involved matrilocal residence. In others, 
as mentioned in section 2.1, even though women might live with their husbands, polygyny – the 
practice of husbands often having several wives – meant limited capacity on the husband’s part 
to supervise any one wife. 
In societies where the proportion of men with ambiguity aversion remained very low, 
avuncular inheritance would not develop. However, in societies which did develop the avuncular 
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inheritance norm, women’s incentives to assure their partners of their paternity would drop. As 
social norms would now ensure that they could rely on their brothers for financial support for 
their children, the importance of securing their husband’s investment in his (putative) children 
would diminish. Hence, once such a norm were in place it might well encourage some women to 
take advantage of their opportunities to have extramarital affairs. Thus, nonpaternity rates in 
societies with avuncular inheritance patterns would rise above the average. This seems to accord 
with empirical evidence [Wilson 1987]. Gaulin and Schlegel (1980) find a strong correlation 
between such nonpaternity rates as measured by incidence of extramarital sex, and inheritance 
patterns, with cultures in which important offices were inherited by maternal rather than paternal 
kin displaying higher nonpaternity. Kurland (1979) similarly finds strong correlations between a 
matrilocal or avunculocal residence pattern and the incidence of nonpaternity as measured by a 
high incidence of extramarital and premarital sex. However, the logic here shows that 
irrespective of the initial level of nonpaternity in these societies, the existence of opportunities to 
cheat could ensure that a significant proportion of men were ambiguity averse. This could then 
generate an avuncular inheritance norm which in turn would raise nonpaternity above normal 
through its incentive effects on women. Meanwhile, societies where only a few men were driven 
by ambiguity aversion retained a patrilineal inheritance norm (inheritance in the male line of 
descent) which weakened women’s incentives to cheat by increasing the importance of boosting 
their partners’ paternity confidence in order to promote paternal investment. Therefore, 
nonpaternity rates in these societies remained low – even when women’s opportunities increased 
due to, say, greater participation in the formal labor force. This explains why some men – those 
who remained particularly ambiguity averse - would refrain from investing in their wives’ 
children even in societies with high paternity probability and patrilineal inheritance. It also 
shows that high nonpaternity might be the result of an avuncular inheritance norm, and not 
necessarily the cause, as is traditionally assumed. 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
I link two phenomena – the anthropologically supported phenomenon that some men invest in 
their sisters’ children rather than their wives’, and the experimentally supported phenomenon 
that some individuals display ambiguity aversion – to develop a theory of how an increase in 
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ambiguity aversion can induce men to invest in their sisters’ children, rather than their wives’.  
This result holds even when individuals are indifferent to known risks. The tendency to invest in 
sisters’ children is more pronounced than in a SEU framework. Moreover, the special case of 
extreme ambiguity aversion in this model reduces to the Gilboa-Schmeidler MEU framework 
wherein men would always invest in sisters’ children regardless of actual paternity rates or risk 
preferences. The model in this paper avoids the problems of the expected relatedness models 
which imply that societies must have implausibly high nonpaternity rates to justify investment in 
sisters’ children. At the same time it differs from Diamond and Locay’s solution. Its most basic 
difference from both these models is that it emphasizes that men make these decisions in an 
ambiguous, rather than a risky, environment.  
 This paper can thus be viewed in two ways. First, it sheds light on an unusual application 
of ambiguity aversion, one for which a body of anthropological evidence exists. Secondly, it 
provides behavioral underpinnings – in terms of ambiguity aversion – for the phenomenon of 
some men investing in their sisters’ children in preference to their wives’ children. At an 
institutional level, it highlights the behavioral factors underlying avuncular inheritance norms.  
I also offer a theory of circumstances which could increase the occurrence of “genetic 
ambiguity averters” and create an avuncular inheritance norm (though I do not argue that mine is 
the only possible explanation for the rise of such a norm) – a norm which in turn could boost 
actual nonpaternity. This would generate the observed link between higher nonpaternity and 
inheritance through maternal rather than paternal kin. However in this case the link is generated 
through a channel not usually considered in the literature. 
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